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The New Phantasmagoria: Transcoding the Violence of Financial Capitalism  	  
Radical philosophy may thus far have missed a critical encounter with contemporary 
architecture, but architecture has, for some time, encountered theory as the instrument 
of its own disciplinary reinventions. Since the late 60s, architecture has imported from 
theory, especially in its ‘continental’ variants, a range of concepts with which to 
freight its own discourse as radical, or as at least ‘progressive’.  
 
From the Situationist International and the événements of Paris May 68 Bernard 
Tschumi, at the Architectural Association in London in the early 70s, derived his 
architecture of ‘events’, while Nigel Coates (also at the AA) borrowed from their 
‘psychogeography’ to fabricate a narrative approach to architecture and urbanism. In 
the 80s Tschumi, alongside others, most notably Peter Eisenman, then took the 
philosophy of deconstruction as the inspiration for the invention of a 
‘deconstructivist’ architecture (Eisenman even working with Derrida on a design 
proposal for the Parc de la Villette in Paris).1 By the early 90s, following the 
movement of a broader Deleuzian turn in theory itself, it was to the thought of Gilles 
Deleuze and his writings with Félix Guattari that certain architects and architectural 
theorists began to express their allegiances.  
 
This architectural ‘Deleuzism’2 initially centred on Deleuze’s The Fold: Leibniz and 
the Baroque,3 and the chapter ‘1440: The Smooth and the Striated’, from A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 4 A special edition of Architectural Design, 
titled Folding in Architecture, was published in 1993 featuring essays and projects by 
Peter Eisenman, Greg Lynn and Jeffrey Kipnis, among others.5 Its contributors sought 
to correlate Deleuze’s account of ‘the fold’ in the philosophy of Leibniz with the 
formal complexity of a ‘new architecture’ (as Kipnis had called it).6  
 
Conceptually related to the fold, the schema of the smooth and the striated was 
originally elaborated in A Thousand Plateaus to articulate the relations between open 
and closed systems in technology, music, mathematics, geography, politics, art and 
physics. Smooth space was figured as topologically complex, in continuous variation 
and fluid. This was a space through which one drifted, nomadically. Striated space, by 
contrast, was defined by its rigid geometry, a territory carved into functional 
categories channeling the movements of its occupants along the pre-inscribed lines of 
a Cartesian grid. Striated space was standardized, disciplinary and imperial. Again, 
these concepts, particularly Deleuze and Guattari’s implicit (though qualified) 
privileging of smooth space and continuous variation over static geometry, were 
found to resonate with architecture’s engagement with complex topologies.7 At the 
same time, they were used to imbue architecture’s move to formal experimentation 
with philosophically radical implications. The virtues of Deleuzian ‘smoothing’ and 
the pursuit of ‘continuous variation’ were affirmed in the architectural writings of 
Lynn, Reiser and Umemoto, Zaha Hadid, Patrick Schumacher and Alejandro Zaera-
Polo, among others, so as to suggest the philosophical substance of the complex 
formal modulations characteristic of their work.8  
 
The usefulness of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy to architecture was not confined, 
however, to servicing it with the formal tropes of folding and smoothing. 
Architecture’s Deleuzian turn also offered the discipline an escape route from its prior 
entanglements in the linguistic and semiotic paradigms of postmodernism and 
deconstruction. The new Deleuzian orientation, wrote Kipnis, marked a turn from 
‘post-structural semiotics to a consideration of recent developments in geometry, 
science and the transformation of political space, a shift that is often marked as a 
move from a Derridean to a Deleuzean discourse’.9  
 
What was decisive in this new theoretical orientation, however, was not just its 
switching from linguistically based paradigms to more ‘properly’ architectural 
concerns with space, form and geometry. The Deleuzian turn in architecture also 
marked the initial stages of its still ongoing mission to disengage itself entirely from 
the perceived dead end of theory’s critical negations, and to forge a new alliance with 
the corporate and managerial agendas of neoliberalism.  
 
Trouble in theory 
The trouble with theory, especially of the type once so eagerly embraced by 
architecture, had been that the perspectives it opened up tended to be deeply 
destabilizing and unsettling, particularly for any host discipline aiming to selectively 
harness these to its own agenda. As François Cusset has observed,  ‘Sometime in the 
third quarter of the twentieth century, in France but not only there, theory joyfully 
stopped making sense, and began cracking all existing frames...theory used to be 
reasonable, more than strictly rational, and for some reason which remains to be fully 
explained theory turned crazy’.10 Unleashed from the lieu propre of Hegelian 
dialectics and freed from the confines of its disciplinary demarcations — by figures 
such as Althusser, Foucault and Derrida — theory began to produce ‘a 
transdisciplinary open field, loose yet closely related to literature, politics and 
psychoanalysis’.11 Theory turned ‘crazy’, Cusset suggests, because its critical labour 
was endlessly multiplied and turned against itself with every encounter it staged 
between once discrete fields of knowledge. It lost its identity in the multiple 
displacements, doubts and suspicions arising from these encounters. Troubled and 
troubling, theory became a ‘demon’ that ‘began to possess the Western intellectual 
body’.12  
 
Something of theory’s demonic quality is also apparent in the description of its 
encounter with architecture given by K. Michael Hays in the introduction to his 
Architecture Theory since 1968:  
 
From Marxism and semiotics to psychoanalysis and rhizomatics, architecture 
theory has freely and contentiously set about opening up architecture to what is 
thinkable and sayable in other codes, and, in turn, rewriting systems of thought 
assumed to be properly extrinsic or irrelevant into architecture’s own idiolect.13  
 
Throughout the period from 1968 to 1993 with which Hays’s anthology is concerned, 
theory may be conceived as a demonic, troubling presence within architecture — at 
the same time as an exhilarating one — since it forges all manner of unforeseen 
connections between architecture and language, the unconscious, capital, class and 
gender, and, locating these in the forms, practices and structures of architecture, 
shows them residing in the very places where the discipline might have thought itself 
able to locate its autonomy. Rather than finding itself straightforwardly enriched by 
such encounters, architecture, like theory itself, in its relentless work of translation, 
correlation and displacement, found its foundations unsettled and, according to some, 
its mission compromised. Michael Speaks, for example, writes that theory ‘attached’ 
itself to architecture and then drove it towards a ‘resolutely negative’ condition.14 
 
The Deleuzian turn was also related, in significant ways, to the subsequent emergence 
of a ‘post-critical’ architectural discourse. Marked by the publication of Robert Somol 
and Sarah Whiting’s ‘Notes Around the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of 
Modernism’ in the journal Perspecta in 2002, the post-critical position argued that 
critique was extrinsic to the ‘proper’ concerns of architecture and served the 
discipline only as a counterproductive form of ‘negativity’.15 Alejandro Zaera-Polo 
(principal, with Farshid Moussavi, of the now defunct Foreign Office Architects), for 
instance, described the critical, in its negativity, as inadequate to deal with 
contemporary levels of social complexity. Deleuze, in contrast, offered insight into 
this condition and affirmed its productivity: 
 
[The] paradigm of the ‘critical’ is in my opinion part of the intellectual models that 
became operative in the early 20th century and presumed that in order to succeed 
we should take a kind of ‘negative’ view towards reality … today the critical 
individual practice that has characterized intellectual correctness for most of the 
20th Century is no longer particularly adequate to deal with a culture determined 
by processes of transformation on a scale and complexity difficult to understand … 
you have to be fundamentally engaged in the processes and learn to manipulate 
them from the inside. You never get that far into the process as a critical 
individual. If we talk in terms of the construction of subjectivity, the critical 
belongs to Freud a Lacan [sic], what I called ‘productive’, to Deleuze.16 
 
More bluntly, Kipnis described criticality as a ‘disease’ that he wanted to ‘kill’, ‘once 
and for all’.17 Today, the post-critical has become a new orthodoxy within certain 
tendencies in architecture, and its attacks on criticality are no less strident or 
(paradoxically) negative than those of Zaera-Polo or Kipnis. In his The Sympathy of 
Things (2011), Lars Spuybroek describes the twentieth century as ‘our true Dark 
Ages’.18 Among the horrors that define it as such for Spuybroek, including those of 
Auschwitz and nuclear weapons, he reserves special mention for the objects of post-
criticality’s censure: ‘we even survived semiotics and deconstruction. And criticality 
too.’19 
 
The castigation of critical ‘negativity’ has been extended further (and from the same 
quarters), into arguments against thought, cognition, and intellectual reflection as 
conditions of architectural and spatial experience. In their place affect, complexity, 
networked relations, new materialisms and new vitalisms are now privileged. Kipnis, 
for instance, has stated that now is the ‘time of matter’, not ideas. This principle, he 
argues, derives from the origins of the universe: ‘There were no signs, no ideas, no 
concepts, no meanings, no disembodied spirits, no dematerialized abstractions 
whatsoever around during the first couple of seconds after the Big Bang, nor during 
the first million or billion years, or, for that matter, even these days.’20  
 
For Spuybroek, ‘meaning’ is a ‘horrible word that lets us believe that the mind can 
trade aesthetics for textual interpretation’.21 Ideas and intelligence are properties of 
the relations between life, matter and technique, rather than products of the mind. 
‘Matter’ he writes, ‘can think perfectly well for itself’. Humans have no special place 
or distinctive capacity within Spuybroek’s world of ‘things’; a world in which all 
relations are ones of ‘sympathy’, understood as ‘the power of things at work, working 
between all things, and between us as things’. ‘Humans’, he says, ‘are nothing but 
things among other things’.22  Reified in this fashion, human subjectivity is relieved 
of its interpretive, reflective and critical capacities and required, instead, only to give 
itself over to the immediacy of purely affective relations passing between things. 
 
Alejandro Zaera-Polo, likewise affirming the primacy of affect over intellect and 
matter over meaning, has outlined the implications of this position for architecture. 
‘The primary depository of contemporary architectural expression’ he writes, in his 
essay ‘The Politics of the Envelope’, ‘is now invested in the production of affects, an 
uncoded, pre-linguistic form of identity that transcends the propositional logic of 
political rhetorics.’23  Pursuing a similar line of argumentation, Sylvia Lavin, in her 
Kissing Architecture, has proposed a ‘kissing [intimately relational] architectural 
surface’, which is not ‘legible and demanding of focused attention’, but that is 
‘affective and eidetic because it shapes experience through force rather than 
representation.’24 
 
From this position contemporary architecture is able to release itself from any 
obligation to articulate an intelligible relationship to the social. In place of this it 
proposes to produce a purely sensible and immediately experiential condition through 
the fabrication of ‘atmospheres’ and ‘environments’ through which subjects may be 
steered. In the second volume of Patrik Schumacher’s The Autopoesis of 
Architecture, for example, he tasks contemporary architecture with ‘channeling 
bodies’ and ‘guiding subjects’ through the design of such environments.25 Questions 
and representations of the political, the social, and the economic are to be excluded 
from consideration in the design of these environments, on the basis that we now 
inhabit some form of pre-linguistic or post-representational world, or that these 
concerns should be placed, as Schumacher has argued, beyond the purview of 
architecture,26 or, according to Zaera-Polo (following Manuel De Landa in this), 
because it is probably best not to speak any longer of larger totalities such as 
capitalism or society.27 Rather than to a capitalist axiomatic of growth and 
accumulation, it is to matter, now construed as productively complex, self-organizing, 
networked and creative, that power is ascribed. Architecture should, it follows, 
understand its practice as operating in accordance with this understanding. Its self-
assigned task is to organize the relations between a reified subjectivity and a vitalized 
matter. 
 
From its initial turn to Deleuze and Guattari, then, this architectural current has 
arrived at an argument accounting for architectural design and spatial experience as 
practices of pure immediacy. The question of mediation—of the relation of this 
architecture to the operation of power (other than as an immanently materialist one), 
on the one hand, or to the social subjects of its operation, on the other—has, it is 
supposed, been entirely superseded. Furthermore, architecture has extricated itself 
from the troubling nature of radical thought, either through ditching theory altogether, 
or through aligning itself with theorists who share its hatred of criticality, such as 
Bruno Latour,28 or with figures such as Manuel De Landa, who have served them 
with a version of Deleuze and Guattari from which any Marxian residue has been 
wiped clean.29 It is precisely at this juncture, and on these terms, however, that the 
prospect of a critical re-encounter between radical philosophy and the type of 
architecture discusssed here emerges. The first task of this re-encounter would be to 
address the relations between architecture and the larger totalities that its discourse 




Architecture has not been alone in undertaking to refashion its identity and purpose 
according to vitalist and new materialist paradigms. The creative productivity imputed 
to networks, complexity, emergence and self-organisation has, in fact, been embraced 
across a wide range of social, economic, political, institutional and commercial fields. 
Advocate of the ‘digital economy’, Don Tapscott, for instance, writes that ‘The 
industrial hierarchy and economy are giving way to molecular organizations and 
economic structures.’30 In their book It’s Alive: The Coming Convergence of 
Information, Biology, and Business, Christopher Meyer and Stan Davis observe: 
 
 we will again have scientific management—but this time the underlying science will be 
‘general evolution’. The theories that drive biology will be adopted in the way we use 
information, and the way we manage our enterprises. Biology, information, and 
business will converge on general evolution.31 
 
 
Such developments in business management have been acknowledged by figures such 
as Schumacher and Zaera-Polo as significant for architecture’s future orientation. 
Schumacher has argued that architecture should translate the ‘new social tropes’ of 
contemporary organizational models into new ‘spatial tropes’.32  Architecture, he 
suggests, not only becomes more relevant in servicing these organizational models, it 
also joins them in affirming what is described as an ‘emancipatory’ project of 
producing de-hierarchized, flexible and informal networks.  There is, Schumacher 
writes, ‘no better site for a progressive and forward-looking project than the most 
competitive contemporary business domains’.33 
  
Zaera-Polo has similarly argued for the progressive and productive qualities inherent 
to de-hierarchized and complex ‘material organizations’, understood as now 
encompassing economics, politics, infrastructures, education and cultural production. 
Claiming that ‘contemporary power structures operate as physical aggregates where 
behavior is created through the localized complex association of molecular 
components’,34 he suggests that architecture will become progressive through aligning 
itself with such ‘emerging complex orders’.35 
 
Raw material 
Architects have thus acknowledged the widespread turn to the organizational models 
referred to here, and the contribution of their own practice to these, but have mystified 
the historical conditions of their appearance. To the extent that the origins of these 
models are addressed at all, they are typically held to have themselves ‘emerged’, 
zeitgeist-like, in the natural—and ‘progressive’—course of things. In the latter 
thought of Deleuze (largely, and for obvious reasons, ignored within architectural 
writing), however, a succinct account is offered of how the appearance of complex, 
laterally organized and ‘open’ organisational models, across a broad spectrum of 
fields and practices, were coming to constitute a new and ever more totalizing form of 
power operating through what he termed ‘societies of control’.36 In perhaps one of the 
philosopher’s most infamous statements on power, he warns: ‘Compared with the 
approaching forms of ceaseless control in open sites we may come to see the harshest 
confinement as part of a wonderful happy past’.37 
 
Deleuze’s conception of a ‘society of control’ was, in part, developed from certain 
perspectives opened up in the earlier work of Foucault, whose Discipline and Punish 
first addresses the appearance a post-disciplinary society of ‘lateral controls’ in which 
‘the massive, compact disciplines are broken down into flexible methods of control, 
which may be transferred and adapted’.38 In his subsequent analysis of neoliberalism, 
as a historically specific mode of governmentality, he described it operating as ‘an 
environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of 
individuals’.39 
 
Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, in their The New Spirit of Capitalism,40 have 
produced a critique of contemporary networked, self-organizing and anti-bureaucratic 
models of workplace management attending, in depth, to their historical conditions of 
emergence. Worker’s demands for  ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-management’, articulated in 
the wake of May 68, they argue, were strategically subverted by employers’ 
subsequent demands that workers should indeed manage themselves, though not in 
the cause of liberation, but of increased productivity and efficiency. Self-motivation, 
flexibility, and interpersonal skills, they argue, became the requisite attributes of a 
new organisational paradigm in which control was to be effectively internalized by 
the worker: 
 
 ‘Controlling the uncontrollable’ is not something with an infinite number of solutions: 
in fact, the only solution is for people to control themselves, which involves 
transferring constraints from external organizational mechanisms to people’s internal 
dispositions, and for the powers of control they exercise to be consistent with the firm’s 
general project.41 
 
Such analyses of the historical conditions under which the new organizational models 
developed, and of how they have been instrumental to new modes of power, all centre 
to some extent upon questions of subjection. Theorists of Italian post-operaismo—
Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato, Christian Marazzi, Antonio Negri42—have, in their 
accounts of ‘general intellect’ and ‘immaterial labour’, been especially concerned 
with the ways in which contemporary techniques in management and organization are 
now invested in the production of subjectivity, rather than, or at least alongside, those 
of commodity production. These organizational techniques are, they have argued, 
addressed to the subject’s communicative, creative and affective potentials, and to the 
mobilization of these in the production of value. ‘If production today is directly the 
production of a social relation’, writes Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘then the raw “material” 
of immaterial labor is subjectivity and the “ideological” environment in which this 
subjectivity lives and reproduces.’43  
 
While this current of radical thought has long been concerned with the ways in which, 
under post-Fordism and neoliberalism, subjectivity becomes the ‘raw material’ of 
valorization, it has also attended to the existential insecurities and ‘precarities’ that the 
subject is exposed to in the all-pervasive financialization of the economy. The 
‘violence of financial capitalism’, as Marazzi has recently described it, stems 
precisely from the fact that financialization is not confined to a specific sector of the 
economy, or to a particular aspect of social practice, but is spread throughout its 
entirety. Furthermore, it is through networked and laterally connective conditions, 
ones that architects and the gurus of new managerial models alike have affirmed as 
progressive, that financialization, with its concomitant precarities and crises—
especially evident in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8—seeps into all the 
spaces and times of everyday life. This all-pervasive condition of financialization 
may, then, be understood as operating through the same ‘open’ systems as those that 
characterize Deleuze’s ‘societies of control’. Continuous modulation and lateral 
connectivity constitute both an apparatus of control and a medium of financialization. 
In fact, these two functions combine to form a particular mode of governmentality.  
 
As Lazzarato has argued, in his The Making of the Indebted Man, the social and 
existential conditions produced through financialization are not the result of some 
merely temporary glitch in the system—as the term ‘crisis’ problematically implies—
but serve as a technique for the production of a compliant subjectivity for that system. 
‘Governmentality’, he writes, ‘has produced a collective capitalist … which is not 
concentrated in finance, but operates throughout business, administration, service 
industries, political parties, the media and the university.’44 Jonathan Crary similarly 
observes in 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep, that ‘the elaboration, the 
modeling of one’s personal and social identity, has been reorganized to conform to 
the uninterrupted operation of markets, information networks, and other systems.’45 
This relentless exposure of the subject to the logic of financial capital at all levels 
marks its violence; the violence of being compelled to be always at or available for 
work (paid or unpaid), to be always working upon oneself, in the acquisition of 
contacts, projects and connections, to produce in oneself the requisite mental 
dispositions and affective skills, and to make oneself mobile and flexible enough to 
survive the now normalized existential conditions of debt, precarity and crisis. 
 
It is vital to the maintenance of this arrangement, of course, that these conditions are 
mediated, at the points where they are to work directly upon the production of 
subjectivity, in significantly more positive terms. Given the turn in architecture 
towards the accommodation of contemporary managerial paradigms, and its 
enthusiasms for the ‘progressive’ character of marketization, its contributions to this 
work of mediation ought to be addressed. Radical philosophy’s re-encounter with 
architecture might concern itself, among other things, with how it is that an 
architecture identifying itself with a condition of uncoded and pure immediacy 
contributes, in fact, to the mediation, the affirmative ‘transcoding’, of financial 
capital.46 However seemingly anachronistic, it may be through the concept of the 
phantasmagoria, as employed first by Marx, and later by Walter Benjamin and 
Theodor Adorno, that some critical purchase on this concern may be gained. 
 
The matter of mediation  
Marx, in the first volume of Capital, invokes the concept of the phantasmagoria in his 
analysis of the fetishistic character of the commodity form: 
  
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the 
fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labour as 
objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural 
properties of these things … It is nothing but the definite social relation between 
men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic [‘phantasmagorisch’ 
(phantasmagorical) in the original] form of a relation between things.47 
 
Marx argues here that we do not, and in fact cannot, experience our social relations 
through face-to-face interaction, or directly through our labour, but only through the 
exchange of the things produced by our labour. The commodity-form of these things 
then takes on the fetishized quality through which our social relations are mediated: 
‘the labour of the private individual manifests itself as an element of the total labour 
of society only through the relations which the act of exchange establishes between 
the products, and through their mediation, between the producers.’48 The 
phantasmagorical appearance of these relations—thing-like between people and social 
between things—conceals the actual conditions of labour in the fetish character of the 
commodity, but is not to be regarded simply as an optical illusion that might be 
removed by rational understanding. This phantasmagoria is, rather, the lived reality of 
the social relations Marx is describing, and through which these relations ‘appear as 
what they are’49, i.e., as necessarily mediated by things. 
 
Without being entirely superseded, the conditions of labour, social relations and 
commodity production that Marx describes here have also been developed into the 
post-Fordist and neoliberal realms of immaterial labour with which the thought of 
Italian post-operaismo has been concerned. Now we also work upon ourselves, in and 
through the relational conditions that sustain the financialization of everyday life (and 
not simply, as before, so as to reproduce ourselves for work), so as to become, in 
effect, the exchangeable products of our own labour. It is our subjectivity that, 
through this productive labour, now itself becomes thing-like, a commodity defined 
by the exchange value of our knowledge, skills, and affective dispositions, of our 
adaptability, availability and flexibility. Marx’s characterization of relations under 
industrial capitalism, as thing-like between people and social between things, might 
then be reformulated, for financial capitalism, as ones in which the social is a thing-
like relation between people treated as things.  
 
If these relations can be described as also appearing in phantasmagorical form, it is 
because the conditions of labour they necessitate are similarly concealed. Only now 
these are not, or not only, the working conditions of the factory, but the conditions of 
working upon oneself, of making oneself subject to the precarities, extended hours, 
and continuous training involved in fashioning the self for exchange, and of 
encountering others under conditions of what Virno has described as ‘opportunism, 
cynicism and fear’.50 The discursive work of the new phantasmagoria consists of 
expressing these conditions in the affirmative terms of actor-networks, assemblages, 
self-organizing systems and new materialisms. When Spuybroek claims that humans 
‘are nothing but things among other things’, for example, and that we are relieved of 
the burden of critical reflection through this knowledge, the supposed immediacy of 
his materialism actually operates as a form of mediation: the reification of subjectivity 
is presented as returning us to an ontological truth we should aspire to conform to, 
rather than one determined by the conditions of financial capitalism. 
 
Marx used the figure of the phantasmagoria to analyze social relations in the general 
sense of their ‘appearance’. In the phantasmagorical critique subsequently developed 
by Benjamin and Adorno, however, the term is deployed as means of analyzing 
specific forms of cultural and spatial production such as Wagnerian opera, Art 
Noveau, the Parisian arcade and World Fairs. It is from Adorno’s account of the 
Wagnerian phantasmagoria in particular, though, that the following comments 
regarding contemporary architectural practice are derived. 
 
In his In Search of Wagner, Adorno writes that the ‘occultation of production by 
means of the outward appearance of the product’ is the ‘formal law governing the 
works of Richard Wagner.’ 51 The production referred to by Adorno here as ‘occulted’ 
concerns Wagner’s compositional practice—‘the primacy of chromaticism and the 
leading note’52—but it also refers to the staging and performance of his operas. As 
Susan Buck-Morss has elaborated: ‘At Bayreuth the orchestra—the means of 
production of the musical effects—is hidden from the public by constructing the pit 
below the audience's line of vision.’53 Similarly the labour and techniques through 
which the Rhine Maidens appear to float above the stage, in Wagner’s Der Ring des 
Nibelungen, are obscured from view. Hence Adorno considers the composer’s work 
as essentially phantasmagorical according to the criteria already established by Marx: 
their conditions of labour are concealed, but the products of these appear in the 
commodified form of a fetishized object of consumption. 
 
Today’s architectural phantasmagoria are similarly invested in the ‘occultation of 
production’. The actual working conditions of architectural production—short-term 
contracts, unpaid internships, long hours—rarely resemble, in practice, the type of de-
hierarchized and naturalized organizational models promoted within architectural 
discourse. These conditions, alongside the labour of the actual design processes and 
those of building construction, are rendered imperceptible in the smoothed forms and 
undulating surfaces that characterize the projects of practices such as Reiser + 
Umemoto, Spuybroek’s NOX or Ali Rahim and Hina Jamelle’s Contemporary 
Architecture Practice. Of course one would probably not want to dwell at length in 
any architecture premised, through a kind of Brechtian verfremdungseffekt, upon self-
reflexively foregrounding its own means of construction and production. 
Nevertheless, contemporary architecture’s fetishization of the continuous and 
biomorphic modelling of its surfaces and forms can be tellingly contrasted with other 
possibilities. In architectural Brutalism, for instance, labour and construction 
processes were revealed through the trace of the wooden shuttering indexed upon its 
concrete surfaces. Modernist architecture, more broadly, speaks of itself, in its 
shaping of form according to strict geometrical and/or functional principles, as at least 
implicitly resulting from the intellectual labour of a conscious design process. The 
contemporary architectural phantasmagoria, however, is made to appear as if it had 
produced itself, autogenetically emerging into the world independent of any practice 
of labour, design or construction.  
 
Adorno identifies the purpose of this phantasmagoric mode of appearance in the work 
of Wagner. ‘The product’ he writes, ‘presents itself as self-producing … In the 
absence of any glimpse of the underlying forces or conditions of its production, this 
outer appearance can lay claim to the status of being.’54 The architectural 
phantasmagoria may be said to operate in a similar fashion, but rather than to a 
transcendent conception of ‘being’, it lays claim to the immanence of a vitalised 
materialism and its immediate appearance as such. This immanence is expressed in a 
recurrent trope of contemporary architectural design where buildings, even entire 
urban systems and their infrastructural components, appear as having been 
collectively warped or deformed by an encounter with an abstract set of forces with 
which they are now aligned. Aedas/Aecom’s West Kowloon Terminus, which is to 
connect Hong Kong to cities in the Chinese Mainland by rail, for example, appears to 
register, in its fluid, undulating morphologies, the passing of some great wave through 
the terrain from which it emerges. The design of the terminus also suggests, in its 
alternating bands of generic ‘green space’ and pedestrian pathways, the idea of an 
unconflicted and elegantly achieved convergence of infrastructure, nature and 
mobility. Conditions of friction, conflict and contestation— the processing of subjects 
through the protocols of immigration and customs, the environmental impact of large-
scale infrastructural projects—are mediated in the reassuringly naturalised and 
affirmative forms of an architectural phantasmagoria.  
 
Work upon the acquisition of contacts, skills and information through continuous self-
mobilization also constitute forms of labour ‘occulted’ by the architectural 
phantasmagoria. The compulsion to ‘network’, to move with the currents of a 
hegemonic connectivism, is facilitated by designs in which the ground is modelled as 
continuously ramped or wave-like. The ground planes of projects like Reiser + 
Umemoto’s Foshan Sansui Urban Plan, or SANAA’s Rolex Learning Center in 
Lausanne, remodel the relational imperatives of neoliberalism as artificial landscapes 
so as to imply an experience of freedom from the constraints of older, and more static 
spaces of containment. Likewise the trope of ‘porosity’—exemplified in the openings 
that perforate the planes of both of these projects, or the envelope of Zaera-
Polo/Foreign Office Architects’ Ravensbourne College, punctuated with a network of 
circular fenestration and internally ‘landscaped’ circulation—mediates, as liberating, 
the conditions in which subjects must continuously expose themselves to 
opportunities for refashioning their subjectivity. In the case of Ravensbourne, these 
conditions of mobilization and exposure are derived from new models of education—
the ‘learning landscape’ for instance—through which students are to be ‘released’ 
from the traditional confinements of the ‘ivory tower’ and exposed to the 
entrepreneurial and business models through which their work will now be valorized. 
The Ravensbourne project, in common with the numerous ‘hubs’ and ‘hives’ with 
which older universities have now been retrofitted, is designed as the spatial 
complement to these models.55 
 
Adorno, in In Search of Wagner, criticized, as ‘totalising’, the environments of the 
Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk in the following terms: 
 
[T]he task of [Wagner’s] music is to warm up the alienated and reified relations of 
men and make them sound as if they were still human. This technological hostility 
to consciousness is the very foundation of the music drama. It combines the arts in 
order to produce an intoxicating brew.56 
 
Much contemporary architecture is also aimed at the production of an ‘intoxicating 
brew’, and for related ends. Through an appeal to the sensuous realm of pure 
affectivity, architecture, now conceived as the production of environments and 
atmospheres, affirmatively mediates financialization’s existential conditions as ones 
of smooth transitions, liberating flexibility and vitalized mobility. It does so through 
the production of a totalizing aesthetic in which the subject is fully immersed. 
Designed to present an unbroken perceptual field of sensory experience, any 
inconsistencies or interruptions that might break its affective spell are to be 
eliminated. The ribboned undulations of a project such as Thomas Heatherwick’s 
Pacific Hall mall in Hong Kong, for example, not only define the aesthetic character 
of its large scale elements, but are also to be found reproduced in the smallest of 
details, such as the elevator buttons, or the hinges of toilet doors specially designed so 
as to allow the designer to ‘bend the wooden wall without any visible hinge or line’.57 
Likewise, in the architecture of Zaha Hadid detailing is used to produce what Buck-
Morss, in her account of the phantasmagoria, has termed a ‘total environment’.58 In 
projects such as the BMW Central Building in Leipzig or the MAXXI Museum in 
Rome, the circulational diagrams of the building, with their fluid trajectories and 
precisely calculated intersections, are rendered sensual through the detailing of walls 
and ceilings with the parallel linear elements that snake through their spaces. Here, 
the goal would seem to be to induce a synaesthesia between the internal sense of 
one’s bodily movements—‘proprioception’—and the perception of ones external 
environment—‘exteroception’—through which body and eye are seamlessly aligned 
with a movement sensualized as free-flowing and elegant. 
 
The architecture of such environments offers its occupants no sensory relief from a 
totalizing aesthetic designed explicitly not to be read but to be felt, and affords no 
time or space, in its atmospheres, from which any distance from their affective work 
might be consciously reflected upon or interpreted. This is, therefore, an architecture 
that appears, or supposes itself, to have outmanoeuvred critique. 
 
However, the ideas through which this supposition is maintained and affirmed—those 
of the post-critical and the post-linguistic, of the new materialisms and vitalisms 
where biology, society, and the market happily converge upon a benevolently 
dehierarchized model of organisation—should also be understood as a kind of 
phantasmagorical work. As a spurious form of historicism, through which 
contemporary conditions are affirmed as the herald of some fundamentally new 
paradigm that should now be adhered to, they conceal the longer historical 
continuities (even if ones of continuous change) within capitalism and power in which 
architecture, in this case, is, and has been for some time, implicated. As Crary has 
recenty written, in a similar context: 
 
A logic of economic modernization in play today can be traced directly back to the 
mid ninetecnth century. Marx was one of the first to understand the intrinsic 
incompatibilily of capitalism with stable or durable social forms, and the history of 
the last 150 years is inseparable from the ‘constant revolutionizing’ of forms of 
production, circulation, communication, and image-making.59 
 
Given that Crary also rightly identifies the most consitently used techniques over this 
period as those concerned with ‘the management and control of human beings’, we 
may say that the models through which these techniques have been critically engaged 
have no more been absolutely superseded than the conditions they addressed 
themselves to.60 The critique of the phantasmagoria, then, though of course in need of 
rethinking in relation to the specific terms of financialization—as suggested in this 
essay’s brief remarks on the subject—may serve as one useful point of contact in 
radical philosophy’s re-encounter with architecture. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This collaboration between Eisenman and Derrida began in 1985. In 1989, however, 
Derrida published a letter to the architect in which he repudiated the latter’s 
understanding of deconstruction and publicly severed his connection with 
architectural deconstructivism. Jacques Derrida ‘A letter to Peter Eisenman’, trans. 
Hilary P. Hanel in Assemblage No. 12, August, 1990, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 6-
13.  
2 The author has written elsewhere, and at greater length, on this Deleuzian turn in 
architectural theory. See Douglas Spencer, ‘Architectural Deleuzism: neoliberal 
space, control and the ‘Univer-city’’ in Radical Philosophy 168, July/August, 2011, 
pp. 9-21, and also Douglas Spencer, ‘Architectural Deleuzism II: The possibility 
of critique’ at: http://terraincritical.wordpress.com/2012/03/24/architectural-
deleuzism-ii-the-possibility-of-critique/  
3 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley, London: 
The Athlone Press, 1993. 
4 Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi, London and New York: Continuum 1992. 
5 Greg Lynn (ed), Folding in Architecture, Chichester and Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-
Academy, 1993/2004 (reprinted). 
6 Jeffrey Kipnis, ‘Towards a New Architecture’ in Lynn, op. cit., p. 18. 
7 Deleuze and Guattari cautioned against any straightforward conception of smooth 
space as in itself liberatory or salvational in A Thousand Plateaus: ‘Never believe that 
a smooth space will suffice to save us’, op. cit., p. 500. 
8 See, for example, Jesse Reiser and Nanako Umemoto, Atlas of Novel Tectonics, 
New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2006; Patrik Schumacher, ‘Research 
Agenda’, in Brett Steele (ed), Corporate Fields: New Environments by the AA DRL, 
London: AA Publications, 2005; Patrik Schumacher, Digital Hadid: Landscapes in 
Motion, Basel: Birkhäuser, 2003; Alejandro Zaera-Polo and Roemer van Toorn 
‘Educating the Architect’, 2008, at: http://www.xs4all.nl/~rvtoorn/alejandro.html 
9 Jeffrey Kipnis, ‘Towards a New Architecture’ in Lynn, op. cit., p. 18. 
10 François Cusset, ‘Theory (madness of),’ in Radical Philosophy 167, May/June, 
2011, p. 25.  
11 Ibid. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., p. 24. 
13 K. Michael Hays, ‘Introduction’, Architecture Theory since 1968, ed. K. Michael 
Hays, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998, p. xi. 
14 Michael Speaks, “Intelligence after theory” in Perspecta 38: Architecture After All, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, p. 103 
15 Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting, ‘Notes around the Doppler effect and other 
moods of modernism’, Perspecta 33: Mining Autonomy, 2002 
16 Zaera-Polo and van Toorn, 2008, op. cit. 
17 Jeffrey Kipnis, ‘On the Wild Side’, in Farshid Moussavi, Alejandro Zaera-Polo, and 
Sanford Kwinter (eds), Phylogenesis: FOA's Ark, Barcelona: Actar, 2004, p. 579. 
18 Lars Spuybroek, The Sympathy of Things: Ruskin and the Ecology of Design, 
Rotterdam: V2_Publishing, 2011, p. 264. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Kipnis, 2004, op. cit., p. 571. 21	  Spuybroek, op. cit., p. 174. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Alejandro Zaera-Polo ‘The Politics of the Envelope’, Volume #17, Fall 2008, p. 89. 
24 Sylvia Lavin, Kissing Architecture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 
30. 
25 Patrik Schumacher, The Autopoiesis of Architecture; Volume II:  A New Agenda 
for Architecture, Chichester: Wiley, 2012, p. 135. 
26 According to Schumacher, the bounds by which architecture is circumscribed, as an 
autopoietic system, foreclose the very possibility of its exercising any critical faculties 
or political agency. Schumacher insists that architecture’s accommodation of the 
existing social order must now be absolute since ‘it is not architecture’s societal 
function to actively promote or initiate political agendas that are not already thriving 
in the political arena.’ Ibid., p. 447.	  
27 Manuel De Landa’s ‘assemblage theory’ models all modes of organisational 
processes as ‘isomorphic’ operations occurring at different scales across the 
biological, the geological and the social. This model, a kind of ‘flat ontology’, allows 
for causal agency between different ‘singularities’ but admits of no encompassing 
force directing them toward a preconceived end. See Manuel De Landa, A New 
Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, London and New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
York: Continuum, 2006. Zaera-Polo, following De Landa, argues in ‘The Politics of 
the Envelope’ that ‘In fact, it may be good to stop speaking of power in general, or of 
the State, Capital, Globalization in general, and instead address specific power 
ecologies comprising a heterogeneous mixture of bureaucracies, markets, antimarkets, 
shopping malls, airport terminals, residential towers, office complexes etc.’ Zaera-
Polo, (2008), op. cit., p. 101. 	  
28 Bruno Latour’s ‘actor-network theory’, conceived along similar lines to De Landa’s 
‘assemblage theory’, recognizes no hierarchies within any system, only agents — 
human and non-human — interacting amidst a network within which there are no 
privileged centers. Bruno Latour, a figure increasingly prominent within design and 
architectural discourse, has argued against the ‘negativity’ of critique, and suggested 
that it has, in any case, ‘run out of steam’, that ‘Critical theory died away long ago’. 
See, Bruno Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to 
Matters of Concern’, in Critical Inquiry - Special issue on the Future of Critique, Vol 
30 no 2, p. 248. 
29 Manuel De Landa has argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s attachments to Marx 
represent their own Oedipus complex, from which his own philosophy liberates their 
thinking. See Manuel DeLanda, John Protevi and Torkild Thanem ‘Deleuzian 
Interrogations: A conversation with Manuel De Landa, John Protevi and Torkild 
Thanem’, in Tamara:  Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science, Vol 3 (4) 
2005. For a critique of DeLanda’s de-Marxification of Deleuze and Guattari see Eliot 
Albert, ‘A Thousand Marxes’, in Mute, Autumn 1998, at 
http://www.metamute.org/en/A-Thousand-Marxes 
30 Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked 
Intelligence, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996, p. 53. 
31 Christopher Meyer and Stan Davis, It’s Alive: The Coming Convergence of 
Information, Biology, and Business, New York: Crown Business, 2003, p. 33. 
32 Patrik Schumacher, ‘Research agenda’, in Brett Steele (ed), Corporate Fields: New 
Environments by the AA DRL, London: AA Publications, 2005a, p. 76. 
33 Ibid., p. 79. 
34 Zaera-Polo, (2008), op. cit., p. 103. 
35 Zaera-Polo, ‘Order out of chaos: The material organization of advanced capitalism’, 
in Architectural Design Profile, 1994, 108, p. 28. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, in. Negotiations, 1972-1990, 
trans. Martin Joughin, New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
37 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, in Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-
1990, trans. Martin Joughin, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
1995, p. 175 
38 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan 
Sheridan, London: Penguin, 1977, p. 211. 
39 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France,1978-
79, Michel Senellart (ed), trans. Graham Burchell, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008, p. 259-60. 
40 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Gregory 
Elliot, London and New York: Verso, 2007. 
41 Ibid., p. 80.	  
42 See, Paolo Virno, ‘General Intellect’, trans. Adrianna Bove, 2000, at: 
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno10.htm; Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the 
Multitude, trans. Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson, Los Angeles 
and New York: Semiotext(e), 2004; Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘Immaterial Labour’, in 
Hardt, Michael & Virno, Paolo (eds), Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, 
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997; Christian Marazzi , 
Capital and Affects: The Politics of the Language Economy, trans. Giuseppina 
Mecchia, Los Angeles and New York: Semiotext(e), 2011; Antonio Negri, Marx 
Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, trans. Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan and 
Maurizio Viano, New York: Autonomedia, 1991 
43 Lazzarato, (1997), op. cit., p. 142. 
44 Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal 
Condition, trans. Joshua David Jordan, Los Angeles and New York: Semiotext(e), 
2012, pp. 107-8. 
45 Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep, London and New 
York: Verso, 2013, p. 9. 
46 See Hays, (1998), op. cit., for a more detailed account of ‘transcoding’. 
47 Karl Marx, Capital, Volume I. trans. Ben Fowkes, London: Penguin, 1976, pp. 164-
5. 
48 Ibid., p. 165. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid., p. 165. 
50 Paolo Virno, ‘The Ambivalence of Disenchantment’ in Hardt and Virno, (1997), 
op. cit., p. 33 
51 Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner, trans. Rodney Livingstone, London and 
New York: Verso, 2005, p. 74 
52 Ibid. 
53 Susan Buck-Morss, ‘Aesthetics and anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork essay 
reconsidered’, October, Vol. 62 (Autumn, 1992), p. 25. 
54 Adorno, (2005), op. cit., p. 74. 
55 See Spencer, (2011), op. cit., for a more extensive analysis of this project. 
56 Adorno, (2005), op. cit., p. 89. 
57 Thomas Heatherwick, ‘Pacific Hall’, at: http://www.heatherwick.com/pacific-place/ 
58 Buck-Morss, (1992), op. cit., p. 22. 
59 Crary, (2013), op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
60 Ibid., p. 36.	  
